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Cursor says tampered Claude Code extension on its marketplace reached up to 5,000 users

Cursor said a maliciously modified version of Anthropic's Claude Code extension was on its VS Code extension marketplace for about 11 hours on Thursday, affecting at most 5,000 users. How attackers got control of the publishing account is not yet explained.

2 outlets · 1L · 1C · 0R First reported Account updated
Image: CNA
Image: Ars Technica

1 / 2

The story, neutrally told

Mixed · 2Cursor said on Friday that a maliciously modified version of Anthropic's Claude Code extension was available on its Cursor VS Code extension marketplace on Thursday, affecting up to 5,000 users. Mixed · 2According to Cursor, the malicious version was live from about 2:27 a.m. PT to 1:35 p.m. PT on Thursday (5:27 a.m. to 4:35 p.m. ET), nearly 12 hours. Left · 1Ars Technica identified the malicious build as version 2.1.313. It cited independent researcher Kevin Beaumont as saying Anthropic pushed version 2.1.314 several hours later.

Centre · 1Cursor said the extension tried to collect host and user information, including hostname, username, operating system and public IP address, and tried to set up remote access for the attacker. It said a key step would have failed on most machines because it needs administrator rights. Left · 1Ars Technica reported Cursor's description of the remote access as a persistent SSH backdoor. It uses an added attacker-controlled SSH key, enables the local SSH service and opens a reverse SSH tunnel, with code written for Windows, macOS and Linux. Left · 1Ars Technica said that, because Cursor extensions run with the permissions of the IDE, the backdoored version would likely gain access to local files, source code and developer tooling. It added that bugs in the Windows and macOS code stopped the backdoor working in some cases, though security firm Phorion called it still a significant threat.

Centre · 1Cursor said it removed the malicious version, blocked its distribution and shut down the marketplace as a precaution. It then rebuilt the marketplace and brought it back online, saying no other extensions were affected. Left · 1Ars Technica added that Cursor worked with the cloud provider hosting the reverse-shell server so infected devices could no longer reach it. It also said the marketplace was shut to rotate keys and audit access controls. Mixed · 2The two outlets describe the extension's origin differently. CNA reports Cursor saying the extension was not developed by Anthropic. Ars Technica says Beaumont and Phorian CTO Luke Roberts both said version 2.1.313 was distributed through Anthropic's official Cursor account, which Roberts called a supply-chain compromise of the official distribution channel.

Mixed · 2Neither Cursor nor Anthropic has explained how attackers gained control of the account. Ars Technica says Anthropic has not warned customers and that neither company answered its questions, and CNA says Anthropic did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Every sentence links to the reporting it rests on. The pill in front of each says where its sources sit: Left, Centre or Right when one side supplies at least half of them, Mixed when they are evenly split. The number is how many outlets it cites.

Left1 outlet

Framing
Security-focused investigation that stresses the supply-chain compromise and the silence of Anthropic and Cursor.
Emphasis
Technical detail, outside researchers' views, the unexplained account takeover and Anthropic's lack of public notice.
Leaves out or plays down
Does not repeat Cursor's statement that the extension was not developed by Anthropic, or its point that a key step would fail on most machines without administrator rights.
Charged language
“backdoored”
For example
“Anthropic so far has yet to warn customers of the incident.” — Ars Technica
“It remains unclear why Anthropic isn’t publicly warning customers of the threat” — Ars Technica

Centre1 outlet

Framing
Short, bullet-style report relaying Cursor's account of the incident and its response.
Emphasis
Scope (up to 5,000 users), timing, data the extension tried to collect, and Cursor's remediation.
Leaves out or plays down
Does not mention version numbers, the SSH backdoor details, the use of Anthropic's official account, or the lack of any warning to customers.
For example
“Cursor said the extension was not developed by Anthropic” — CNA

Right0 outlets

No right outlet in our sources has covered this story yet.

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