Opinion: Is US 'strategic ambiguity' on Taiwan still workable?

Mixed · 2Two opinion pieces published between 10 and 13 October 2026 examine the US policy of 'strategic ambiguity' on Taiwan, under which Washington does not say whether it would intervene militarily if China attacked the island. 1 2 Right · 1Andrew Moore, a small business owner and author, argues in the Washington Examiner that the policy was meant to deter Beijing while discouraging Taiwan from provocative moves. He says it may once have made strategic sense but now creates 'room for miscalculation' as China's military has grown. 1 Right · 1Moore's central point is that Washington, Beijing and Taipei may each hold different assumptions about what the others intend. He gives the fate of Taiwan's semiconductor fabrication plants in an invasion as an example, and warns that each could be wrong. He uses Sartre and the film Rashomon as analogies. 1

Right · 1Moore also notes that Trump and Xi Jinping met in Busan, South Korea, on 30 October 2025 and reached an agreement on tariffs and agricultural purchases. He cites Chinese youth disillusionment ('tang ping', 'bai lan') but says it does not necessarily make conflict more likely. 1 Centre · 1The South China Morning Post piece, by Albee Zhang, covers a different argument: a small group of realist US strategists wants the US to rule out military intervention over Taiwan to avoid a catastrophic war with China. Experts quoted say this is still a minority view but is opening debate. 2 Centre · 1Jennifer Kavanagh of Defense Priorities argues the US military is now 'fragile' and short of munitions, and that its ability to outlast China in a Taiwan war is in question. She told the SCMP that in her modelling the US typically runs out of air-defence and offensive missiles before China does. 2

Centre · 1Her 10 September report also proposed replacing US mutual defence treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia with narrower partnerships, and moving most forces away from the first island chain. It drew strong pushback in US national security circles, where it was called a 'bombshell' and 'radical' and was deemed to be Communist Party 'talking points'. 2 Centre · 1The SCMP traces the restraint school back to Ted Galen Carpenter in 1998, with later contributions from Charles Glaser, Doug Bandow, Stephen Wertheim and Michael Swaine. Swaine argues that Taiwan is not a vital enough interest to justify risking a major war with China. Xin Qiang of Fudan University says ambiguity has become meaningless as Chinese power has risen, but that policy inertia makes the non-intervention view unlikely to become mainstream. 2 Centre · 1On Trump, the SCMP reports he has declined to say whether he would defend Taiwan, unlike Joe Biden, who repeatedly said the US would. After a May summit with Xi the US paused a US$14 billion arms sale to Taiwan, which remains on hold. Trump was silent on Taiwan at a second summit last month, the SCMP says. 2